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Transfer of Power from Jiang to Hu: the 
CPC's Transformation
Introduction
One of the major issues at the CPC 16th 
National Congress was whether Jiang Zemin 
would maintain his infl uence upon the Par-
ty after he resigned as General Secretary. Two 
factors would decide the matter. One was the 
designation of new members of the Party's of-
fi cers and the other was how to handle the 
important thought of the "Three Represents".
Regarding the designation of new of-
fi cers, people were concerned about wheth-
er Jiang Zemin would remain as chairman of 
the CPC Central Military Commission, and 
how many confi dants he would be able to des-
ignate as members of the Standing Commit-
tee of the Political Bureau of the CPC Cen-
tral Committee. On the other hand, people 
were also concerned about how the important 
thought of the Three Represents would be in-
tegrated into the report on behalf of the CPC 
Central Committee  (Jiang Zemin report) and 
the Party's amended constitution1.
The National Congress anticipated the 
imminent transformation of the CPC, which 
refl ected the changing aspects of the Party 
through the reform and the open policy since 
1978 and the development of a market econ-
omy since 1992.
This paper analyzes the designation of 
the CPC offi cers, the Jiang Zemin report, and 
the Party's amended constitution, and discuss-
es the transformation of the CPC.
2.1 Designation of Offi cers: Limit-
ed Transfer of Powers from Jiang 
Zemin to Hu Jintao
2.1.1 General Secretary and Chair-
man of the Central Military 
Commission
In accordance with the stipulation on 
the mandatory retirement age of 75 in the 
CPC's internal statutes, Jiang Zemin resigned 
as General Secretary and was replaced by 
Hu Jintao. This was a consequence of Deng 
Xiaoping's decision to designate him at 49 
years of age as a member of the Standing 
Committee of the Political Bureau of the CPC 
Central Committee in order to train young 
leaders. Following the establishment of the 
People's Republic of China, Liu Xiaoqi, Lin 
Biao, Hu Yaobang and Zhao Ziyang, who were 
major successors to Mao Zedong or Deng 
Xiaoping, lost their positions during politi-
cal struggles. Since the establishment of the 
People's Republic of China, the inauguration 
of Hu Jintao is the only case where a General 
Secretary peacefully transferred his supreme 
power to his successor. This suggests that the 
era of Jiang Zemin had been politically stable.
At the 16th National Congress, Jiang Ze-
min remained as chairman of the CPC Cen-
tral Military Commission. In order to keep 
political infl uence in the CPC after the end of 
the 16th Congress, he made efforts to devel-
op his powers during the fi ve years following 
the previous congress2. This merely refl ected 
the desire for power of a man who has once 
reached the top. Because of the impossibili-
ty of continuing as General Secretary, it was a 
personal imperative for Jiang Zemin to retain 
the position of chairman of the Central Mili-
tary Commission at all costs. Retirement from 
this offi ce would have constituted a total re-
tirement from the political stage. In fact, this 
maneuver had already been used by Deng 
Xiaoping who had succeeded in remaining 
in the same position for the preceding term. 
The position of chairman of the CPC Central 
Military Commission had become a de fac-
to supreme position of the CPC. Fortunately 
for those concerned, this position is not gov-
erned by any stipulation regarding mandatory 
retirement age or confl ict of positions. Thus, 
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Jiang Zemin had only to retain this position 
as a source of power for exercising his politi-
cal infl uence during the reign of Hu Jintao.
2.1.2 Members of the Standing Com-
mittee of the Political Bureau of 
the CPC Central Committee
Nine persons were elected as members 
of the Standing Committee of the Political 
Bureau of the CPC Central Committee, the 
supreme decision-making organ of the Party: 
Hu Jintao, Wu Bangguo, Wen Jiabao, Jia Qin-
glin, Zeng Qinghong, Huang Ju, Wu Guan-
zheng, Li Changchun, and Luo Gan (Table 
1).
Three facts should be pointed out re-
garding the election for the Standing Com-
mittee. One is that the new Standing Commit-
tee includes a group of fi ve persons associated 
with Jiang Zemin: Wu Bangguo, Jia Qinglin, 
Zeng Qinghong, Huang Ju, and Li Changc-
hun ("Jiang faction"). This group constitutes 
a majority of the committee and is able to ex-
ercise Jiang Zemin's infl uence.
Hu Jintao in the fi rst rank
This rank is reserved for General Secre-
tary.
Wu Bangguo in the second rank
He was promoted from his previous po-
sition of a member of the Political Bureau 
of the CPC Central Committee. Jiang Zemin 
wished to reserve the second rank for one of 
his confi dants. The leader behind the curtain 
would have lost face if the fi rst two superior 
ranks had been given to a non-Jiang faction 
in spite of gaining a majority. The designa-
tion of Wu Bangguo in the second rank may 
also be a logical consequence since Wu Bang-
guo is serving as vice-premier. He succeeded 
to Li Peng as chairman of the National Peo-
ple's Congress Standing Committee in March 
2003.
Wen Jiabao in the third rank
He is close to Zhu Rongji. He assumed 
the offi ce of premier as successor to Zhu 
Rongji in March 2003. He deserves this third 
rank.
Jia Qinglin in the fourth rank
Jia Qinglin was unexpectedly elected as 
a member of the Standing Committee. Dur-
ing his offi ce of secretary of CPC Fujian Prov-
ince Committee, he could be accused for ne-
glecting his duties regarding smuggling in 
Fujian Province. It was regarded as the worst 
case of corruption in the history of the Peo-
ple's Republic of China. People criticized his 
wife, too. In the long run, spouses were not 
accused, so Jiang Zemin was criticized3. This 
designation, despite the gray background, is 
a positive result of Jiang Zemin's efforts. Jia 
Qinglin became the chairman of the Chinese 
People's Political Consultative Conference in 
March 2003.
Zeng Qinghong in the fi fth rank
He is a member of Jiang Zemin's prin-
cipal staff. When promoted from secretary of 
the CPC Shanghai Municipality Committee to 
CPC General Secretary, Jiang Zemin was ac-
companied by Zeng Qinghong from Shang-
hai. Zeng's two-stage promotion from alter-
nate member of the Political Bureau of the 
CPC Central Committee is exceptional. Be-
sides, her position of fi fth rank is not regard-
ed as modest, and this too is an effect of Jiang 
Zemin's political infl uence. He is a member 
of the CPC Central Committee Secretariat, 
and has assumed the president of the Central 
Party School.
Huang Ju in the sixth rank
He was promoted from a member of the 
Political Bureau of the CPC Central Commit-
tee, and became the vice-premier in March 
2003.
Wu Guanzheng in the seventh rank
He was promoted from a member of 
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the Political Bureau of the CPC Central Com-
mittee. The faction to which he belongs is not 
known. Because he is thought to be close to 
Zeng Qinghong, Wu Guanzheng is certainly a 
member of the Jiang Zemin faction. He is re-
garded as principled, so he has reasonably as-
sumed the secretariat of the Central Commis-
sion for Discipline Inspection. 
Li Changchun in the eighth rank
This time, he was promoted from a 
member of the Political Bureau of the CPC 
Central Committee.
The second fact is that the number of 
members of the Standing Committee was 
raised from 7 to 9. This increase was decided 
probably for Luo Gan.
Luo Gan in the ninth rank
He also was promoted from a mem-
ber of the Political Bureau of the CPC Cen-
tral Committee. He is regarded as close to Li 
Peng. Before the designation of members, he 
had been expected to be ranked higher but 
ended up at ninth, the lowest rank. The pro-
motion may refl ect Li Peng's reduced infl u-
ence in the CPC. The total number of mem-
bers was increased by two probably because Li 
Peng insisted that Luo Gan should be desig-
nated as member of the Standing Committee. 
And the number was increased by two rather 
than one, presumably in order to guarantee 
that decisions can be made by majority.
The third fact in the newly organized 
Standing Committee is that all the previ-
ous members but Hu Jintao was replaced by 
new members. It is considered that the mem-
bers of the Standing Committee must fol-
low a clause on mandatory retirement age 
in the Party's internal statutes. Li Ruihuan 
could have remained in the previous posi-
tion because he is 68 years old. Probably, all 
the members of the third generation retired 
from their offi ce in order to make it easier for 
Hu Jintao to work in the new era. It thus con-
stitutes a renewal of personnel. However, Li 
Ruihuan was in the fourth rank in the 15th 
Standing Committee and might have cov-
eted supreme power like Jiang Zemin. There-
fore, the previous No. 4 member of the Stand-
ing Committee surely accepted a proposal for 
retirement with reluctance. Li Ruihuan was 
probably expelled from the position by Jiang 
Zemin so that the Jiang faction might have a 
majority in the Standing Committee.
2.1.3 Members / Alternate Member 
of the Committee of the Politi-
cal Bureau of the CPC Central 
Committee
The Committee of the Political Bureau 
of the CPC Central Committee is composed 
of 24 members (9 are members of the Stand-
ing Committee) and an alternate member of 
the Political Bureau. It is not possible to clas-
sify them by faction (Jiang faction, non-Jiang 
faction, or Hu Jintao faction). This section an-
alyzes the other 16 members.
At the end of the 16th National Con-
gress, eight secretaries of CPC local commit-
tees were designated as members of the Com-
mittee of the Political Bureau. Some people 
attributed this decision to the importance 
placed on local societies. One should not be 
too rash in reaching a conclusion, and should 
appreciate the fact that the cadre (personnel) 
exchange system between central and local 
organizations is functioning properly.
After the 16th National Congress, it was 
announced that Zhang Dejiang (1), secretary 
of the CPC Zhejiang Provincial Committee, 
was transferred to the CPC Guangdong Pro-
vincial Committee to serve as secretary; Zhou 
Yongkang (2), secretary of the CPC Sichuan 
Provincial Committee, was transferred to the 
CPC Central Committee Secretariat to serve 
as secretary and minister of Public Security; 
Hui Liangyu (3), secretary of the CPC Zheji-
ang Provincial Committee, was transferred to 
the vice-premier. Liu Qi (4), secretary of the 
CPC Beijing Municipality Committee, Chen 
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Liangyu (5), secretary of the CPC Shanghai 
Municipality Committee, and the secretary of 
the CPC Guangdong Provincial Committee 
reasonably reached their reserved positions 
as members of the Committee of the Political 
Bureau. 
Wang Lequan (6), secretary of the CPC 
Xinjiang Uygur Autonomous Region Commit-
tee, and Zhang Lichang (7), secretary of the 
CPC Tianjin Municipality Committee, have 
worked as secretary for more than fi ve years 
and are expected to leave their current offi ce 
for the central organization soon.
Yu Zhengsheng (8), secretary of the 
CPC Hubei Provincial Committee, was elect-
ed not because of their current position but 
because of their knowledge and skills. The 
achievements of Yu, "successor" to his father's 
heritage as politician, in his offi ce of secretary 
of the CPC Qingdao City Committee were 
highly appreciated by many.
Lu Yunshan (9), head of the Publicity 
Department of the CPC Central Committee, 
and He Guoqiang (10), head of the Organiza-
tion Department of the CPC Central Commit-
tee, were elected as members of the Commit-
tee of the Political Bureau as expected.
The soldiers Guo Boxiong (11) and Cao 
Gangchuan (12), vice-chairmen of the CPC 
Central Military Commission, have only taken 
their reserved seats.
Wang Zhaoguo (13), who had already 
registered in the Chinese Communist Youth 
League when Hu Jintao joined it in his youth, 
was probably nominated for this reason. Wu 
Yi (14), State Councilor, was once minister of 
Foreign Trade and Economic Cooperation 
and recorded excellent achievements in trade 
negotiations with foreign government offi cials 
such as those for affi liation to GATT. Foreign-
ers refer to her as "China's Thatcher." She is 
expected to become a vice-premier in charge 
of diplomatic relations in international trade, 
an increasingly important fi eld. Zeng Peiyan 
(15), minister of the State Development Plan-
ning Commission, is one of the rare experts 
in economics in the Political Bureau of the 
CPC Central Committee. He was designated 
as vice-premier in charge of macroeconomics 
as assistant to Wen Jiabao in this fi eld.
2.2 How the Important Thought 
of the "Three Represents" are 
Treated
2.2.1 W h a t  a r e  t h e  I m p o r t a n t  
Thought of the "Three Repre-
sents"?
According to Jiang Zemin report, the 
Chinese Communist Party (1) has evolved 
from a party that led the people in fi ghting 
for state power to a party that has led the peo-
ple in exercising the power and has long re-
mained in power, (2) has developed from a 
party that is leading national reconstruction 
under external blockade and a planned econ-
omy to a party that is leading national de-
velopment while the country is opening to 
the outside world and developing the social-
ist market economy. Along with these chang-
es, there emerged the proposition of what 
kind of Party to build and how to build it. 
The "Three Represents" were presented by Ji-
ang Zemin in February 2000 in answer to this 
proposition.
The "Three Represents" means that the 
Chinese Communist Party represents and em-
bodies three things as the head of the peo-
ple: (1) the development trend of China's ad-
vanced productive forces; (2) the orientation 
of China's advanced culture; and (3) the fun-
damental interests of the overwhelming ma-
jority of the Chinese people. The author inter-
prets these three abstract matters as follows: 
(1) is to develop the productive forces re-
quired for economic progress; (2) is to absorb 
a culture of knowledge required for develop-
ing productive power such as scientifi c tech-
nology and human resources development, 
while retaining the direction of Communism 
to which such culture of knowledge is condu-
cive, and (3) are benefi ts that are not shared 
by some of the people but those that give sat-
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isfaction to the greatest number of people.
Since these details are widely different 
from traditional Marxist theory, there was a 
controversy in the Party4. However, this con-
troversy was tentatively brought to an end by 
the speech of Jiang Zemin on the occasion of 
the Congress held on July 1, 2001 to celebrate 
the 80th anniversary of the founding of the 
Chinese Communist Party. In his speech (on 
July 1, 2001 speech), Jiang Zemin recognized 
the "Three Represents" as "the foundation for 
building our Party, the cornerstone for its gov-
ernance and the source of its strength" and 
judged that it does not deviate from tradition-
al Marxist theory or what has developed from 
it. Thus, the "Three Represents" gained con-
sensus among the Party members as the guide 
to action for the Chinese Communist Party.
2.2.2 The Important Thought of the 
"Three Represents" in the CPC 
16th National Congress
In the Party's amended constitution 
in the CPC 16th National Congress, the im-
portant thought of the "Three Represents" 
was deemed to be the guide to action to be 
taken by the Communist Party, the same as 
Marxism-Leninism, Mao Zedong thought 
and Deng Xiaoping theory. Further, in ad-
dition to the words "Since the Fourth Ple-
nary Session of the Thirteenth Party Cen-
tral Committee......the Chinese Communists, 
with Comrade Jiang Zemin as their chief 
representative......have formed the impor-
tant thought of the `Three Represents'", the 
name Jiang Zemin was included in the Par-
ty constitution as a founder of the important 
thought of the "Three Represents". Thus, the 
authority of Jiang Zemin in the Party was ex-
plicitly established.
2.2.3 Complete Victory of Jiang Ze-
min
To summarize sections 2 and 3, Jiang 
Zemin has succeeded in (1) getting person-
al guarantees and (2) securing authority in 
the CPC 16th National Congress in order to 
secure his own political power under the Hu 
Jintao era. Thus, matters turned out as he had 
expected, and the CPC 16th National Con-
gress ended in complete victory for Jiang Ze-
min.
2.3 Start of Change of the Chinese 
Communist Party: Growing Away 
from the "Workers' and Farmers' 
Party"
The CPC 16th National Congress not 
only secured Jiang Zemin's political infl u-
ence over the Party but it was also a landmark 
in the Party's history, indicating the future di-
rection of the Communist Party. This is re-
fl ected in Jiang Zemin report and the Party's 
amended constitution, which suggests that 
the change of the Communist Party has start-
ed. This section examines where the Chinese 
Communist is headed.
2.3.1 The Focal Part of the Party 
Constitution has been Amend-
ed
In the Party's amended constitution, 
The Chinese Communist Party, to the exist-
ing words, "The Chinese Communist Party, 'is 
the vanguard of the Chinese working class' " , 
were added "and (is vanguard) of the Chinese 
people and the Chinese nation." This signi-
fi ed the great change that a range of interests 
of the Chinese Communist Party will be ex-
panded from specifi c classes to what is univer-
sal. This revision of the focal point of the Par-
ty constitution as well as the inclusion of the 
"Three Represents" as "the fundamental in-
terests of the overwhelming majority of the 
Chinese people" refl ects the growth of the 
Chinese Communist Party from "a class party" 
into "a catch-all party."
According to Liu, the percentage of in-
dustrial workers and farming workers, which 
accounted for 87.2% of all social strata in Chi-
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na in 1978, had declined to 66.6% in 2000 
(Liu [2002]). In other words, more than 20 
years on since the reforms and opening up, 
people other than the working class, which 
includes blue collar workers, farmers, intel-
lectuals, cadres and soldiers, now account for 
a major share of society. Now that the work-
ing class has ceased to represent the whole of 
China due to the diminishing percentage of 
workers and farmers, amendment of the focal 
point of the Party constitution is a practical 
approach.
2.3.2 Evaluation of "New Social Stra-
ta"
Jiang Zemin designated (1) entrepre-
neurs and technical personnel employed by 
non-public scientifi c and technological enter-
prises, (2) managerial and technical staff em-
ployed by overseas-funded enterprises, (3) 
the self-employed, (4) private entrepreneurs, 
(5) employees in intermediaries, and (6) free-
lance professionals, all belonging to non-
working classes, as "a new social stratum" that 
has been born through reform and opening 
up, and recognized them as "all builders of 
socialism with Chinese characteristics."
Furthermore, Jiang Zemin went so far as 
to state that CPC should "admit into the Party 
advanced elements of other social strata (i.e., 
other than workers, farmers, intellectuals, ser-
vicemen and cadres) who accept the Party's 
program and Constitution, work for the real-
ization of the Party's line and program con-
sciously and meet the qualifi cations of Party 
membership following a long period of test." 
He thus vowed that participation of "a new so-
cial stratum" in the Party would be granted on 
condition that they met certain requirements, 
and this has been newly incorporated in the 
Party constitution.
This meant that the Communist Party 
has accepted "a new social stratum" as an "ad-
vanced productive force" for economic devel-
opment and as entity that plays a role in an 
"advanced culture", that is, a role in develop-
ing scientifi c technology and human resourc-
es. Both of these concepts are included in the 
important thought of the "Three Represents." 
In other words, the Communist Party has for-
mally acknowledged as an ally this stratum 
that has been so far in an unstable position 
with no guaranteed position as an ally.
2.3.3 Aiming to Expand the Support 
Base by Co-opting Entrepre-
neurs
The recognition of a new social stra-
tum by the Chinese Communist Party is part 
of its attempt to expand its support base. On 
the face of it, such recognition indicates its in-
tention to become a catch-all party. Howev-
er, from a different perspective, it also refl ects 
the importance the Party places on specifi c 
strata.
What is attracting much public atten-
tion among the new social stratum is the en-
trepreneurs in private business. This is be-
cause entrepreneurs in private business have 
long been viewed as exploiting the classes 
and so were treated as enemies in tradition-
al Marxist theory, but the tide has turned and 
they are now considered as allies. At least six 
entrepreneurs from the private sector partic-
ipated in the CPC 16th National Congress as 
representatives.
According to the State Economic and 
Trade Commission, the amount of taxes paid 
by private enterprises and proprietorships ac-
counts for 9.3% of the total industrial and 
commercial tax. Their share in GDP amounts 
to 30%, and to 60% in the East Coastal Re-
gion alone. They accept 70% of the workers 
who are laid off (xiagang laodongzhe in Chi-
nese) through restructuring of national enter-
prises, etc. (People's Dairy, December 2, 2002). 
The presence of private enterprises and pro-
prietorships are thus indispensable to the 
progress of the Chinese economy.
There were no names of private entre-
preneurs among the 198 members of the CPC 
Central Committee and 158 alternate mem-
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bers of the CPC Central Committee elected at 
the CPC 16th National Congress. Private en-
trepreneurs are indispensable for economic 
development and the Communist Party wish-
es to absorb them to expand their own sup-
port base. For this reason, Jiang Zemin report 
referred to improving the legal system con-
cerning the protection of private property, 
which is an improvement desired by many pri-
vate entrepreneurs, but their political rise is 
not welcome.
The above-mentioned requirements for 
joining the Party cannot be easily fulfi lled and 
the ratio of private entrepreneurs allowed 
to join the Party was no more than 19.8% in 
2000 (Dai [2001, p75]). Private entrepreneurs 
who are members of the Party at present are 
in many cases so-called "xia hai - leaving pub-
lic offi ce for private enterprise" where a cadre 
of a local division of the Party or local govern-
ment changes jobs and moves into the busi-
ness world5. In other words, the private entre-
preneurs who are members of the Party are in 
a special position that is close to political pow-
er from the start. Further, as symbolized by 
the private entrepreneurs who were elected at 
the CPC 16th National Congress, those that 
the Communist Party really wishes to absorb 
as its support base are limited to managers of 
large private enterprises with economic pow-
er. While there are hopes for their econom-
ic contribution, there is also the intention of 
preventively enclosing them for fear that they 
may engage in anti-Communistic activities 
against the backdrop of their economic pow-
er (Zhong [2000, p23]).
Sixteen managers of enterprises have 
been elected as members or alternate mem-
bers of the CPC Central Committee and they 
are mainly managers of manufacturers in in-
dustries where the state enjoys a monopo-
ly, key industries and growth industries. It is 
these managers of large state-owned enter-
prises that the Communist Party wishes to 
protect as a political power.
The Jiang Zemin report states "Devel-
opment is our Party's top priority in govern-
ing and rejuvenating the country....... prog-
ress should be focused on construction of the 
economy." Further, in revising the Party con-
stitution, the following parts of the constitu-
tion have been deleted: the part that says (1) 
"(Marxism-Leninism) points out that it ana-
lyzes contradictions inherent in the capital-
ist system that it cannot overcome, socialis-
tic society replaces capitalism and it develops 
into the Communist society without fail. As 
the history of more than one hundred years 
since the publicizing of the Declaration of the 
Communist Party attests, the theory of scien-
tifi c socialism is right and socialism has strong 
vitality. The essence of socialism is to liberate 
productive powers, develop them, extinguish 
exploitation and achieve common prosperi-
ty in the end," and the part that says (2) "Al-
though socialism has its turns and twists and 
its repetition, it is a general non-retrogres-
sive trend of historical development of society 
that Communism never fails to take the place 
of capitalism." This means that traditional 
Marxist theory's claim that the exploitation of 
the classes will be extinguished, and that his-
tory will develop such that socialism takes the 
place of capitalism and Communism will be 
realized in the end, which is perhaps the rai-
son d'etre of the Communist Party, has been 
totally deleted. There is thus a wish to avoid 
branding capitalism as an evil to be replaced. 
These measures have been taken to ensure 
consistency between Marxist theory and the 
current practice of economic development 
based on the market economy system.
2.3.4 Choice of the Chinese Commu-
nist Party
Lastly, I would like to present a hypoth-
esis and prospects for metamorphosis of the 
Chinese Communist Party.
Based on the outcome of CPC 16th Na-
tional Congress, that is, recognition of a new 
social stratum, inclusion of private entrepre-
neurs elected as representatives as well as 
managers of state enterprises as members or 
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alternate members of the CPC Central Com-
mittee, it would appear that the Chinese 
Communist Party is willing to accept capital-
ism and capitalists for the sake of economic 
progress. This suggests that the Chinese Com-
munist has grown away from being a "workers' 
and farmers' party", and is shifting toward be-
ing a "Capitalist's Party" rather than "a catch-
all Party."
The Chinese Communist Party still has 
the dual faces of a catch-all Party and a Capi-
talist's Party This corresponds to the political 
alternatives of giving priority to eliminating 
economic discrepancies and providing relief 
for the socially vulnerable such as reemploy-
ment of the unemployed or laid-off workers, 
which are imminent issues, and giving priority 
to preferential treatment for the strong such 
as managerial support for capitalists where 
wealth is concentrated. The Communist Party 
will be forced to choose one of the two alter-
natives in the course of time. This is perhaps 
also a new ideological confl ict that remains to 
be resolved.
Conclusion: Expectations for Hu Jin-
tao
When government leaders are reshuf-
fl ed, people tend to have great expectations 
in them, but they often prove disappointing. 
The greater the expectations, the greater the 
disappointment. Hu Jintao may be fortunate 
in that respect, as many people know that Ji-
ang Zemin still maintains great infl uence and 
Jiang Zemin assigned only partial authority to 
Hu Jintao. The people therefore have fewer 
expectations for Hu Jintao.
In his inaugural address as General Sec-
retary of CPC, Hu Jintao declared that he 
would follow the line of Jiang Zemin (People's 
Dairy, November 15, 2002), perhaps refl ect-
ing the political infl uence still held by Jiang 
Zemin. But it is not for a passive reason that 
he should follow the line of Jiang Zemin. For 
the Chinese Communist Party to remain as a 
ruling party, its only option is for Hu Jintao to 
maintain the system of one-party dominance 
by the Communist Party in political terms and 
to push forward with development of the mar-
ket economy in economic terms. Hu Jintao 
cannot be expected to set his own policy after 
the complete retirement of Jiang Zemin.
If Hu Jintao is driven by a desire to steer 
a course independent of others, his trump 
card is to introduce political pluralism for po-
litical reform. But Hu Jintao is not a man who 
has ascended to his present position as Gen-
eral Secretary like previous number twos who 
have climbed the ladder of political strife to 
win supremacy. He was appointed as succes-
sor in the current political system, which is a 
system of one-party dominance by the Com-
munist Party and has followed the path of the 
supreme leader. For him, the current polit-
ical system is the most useful and Hu Jintao 
is unlikely to push forward with reforms that 
would destroy the present political system un-
less a most disordered political situation such 
as an intense struggle for power should pres-
ent itself. The political reform carried out by 
Hu Jintao will be limited to reforms within 
the framework of the current political system.
(Norihiro SASAKI)
Notes:
1. The author discussed several major stakes at the 
16th National Congress before it was held [Sasaki 
(2002b)].
2. The campaigns such as the "Three Stresses" 
education since 1998, great development of Western 
China since 1999 and "Three Represents" study have 
been conducted mainly as political movements for 
establishing the authority of Jiang Zemin.
3. For the smuggling case, see Sasaki & Imai [2001] and 
Sasaki & Ohara [2002].
4. For this controversy, see Sasaki [2002a].
5. For instance, Shen Wenrong, who participated in 
the CPC 16th National Congress as representatives, 
is a typical "xia hai - leaving public offi ce for private 
enterprise," who became a private entrepreneur from 
an elite cadre of a local division of the Party. Before 
becoming of the chief executive of Shagang Steel, 
Jiangsu, he had been deputy secretary of the CPC 
Municipality Committee of Zhangjiagang, Jiangsu 
Province and chairman of Municipality Political 
Consultative Conference Committee of the same 
Municipality.
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